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Abstract

The aim of this project is to explain what factors account for the differentials in
treatment of Bosnian refugees in Sweden and Germany. Although both of these
states are signatories of the same international conventions that govern states’
humanitarian obligations toward refugees, the resources available to the refugees
varied greatly between both countries, which in turn influenced the lived
experiences of the Bosnian refugees. This paper examines these discrepancies
within the contexts of ideas about national citizenship, the existence of
governmental institutions designed to foster refugee integration, and external, nonstate factors such as the media and other charitable organizations that were capable
of impacting refugee experiences. My research was primarily conducted through an
examination of academic sources, including books, journal articles, and scholarly
studies. I also relied heavily upon individual interviews conducted by academic
researchers as well as primary source documents from both the Swedish and
German governments. My research revealed in full form the true complexity of the
reasons for the discrepancies and discontinuities in the treatment of Bosnian
refugees. The distinctive political and social histories of Sweden and Germany
provided yet another rich and complicated dimension to my project. Although my
capstone is centered on two specific case studies, the lessons learned from them are
invaluable when discussing the wider implications of incorporating humanitarian
standards in international laws and agreements.
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Executive Summary

The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 plunged the Balkan Peninsula into a

bloody and genocidal war for much of the last decade of the 20th century. Some of
the worst atrocities of the war were perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a

multiethnic area of the former Yugoslavia inhabited by Bosnian Serbs (31.2% of
population), Bosnian Croats (17.4%), and Muslim Bosniaks (43.5%), as well as

multiple other groups. Throughout this tumultuous period, self-interested political
figures such as the Serbian nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic were able to

manipulate issues surrounding ethnicity for their own political gains, which resulted
in a years-long war marked by horrors such as “ethnic cleansing” and mass rape.

The brutality of the war, especially in Bosnian-Herzegovina, prompted millions of

Bosnians to flee their homeland in search of refuge in central, northern, and western
European countries. Germany and Sweden, respectively took in the largest number
of refugees throughout the war years.

In the wake of the disastrous World Wars of the 20th century, many

countries, including Germany and Sweden, signed on to international agreements
pertaining to the treatment of refugees in the hopes of preventing large-scale

humanitarian catastrophes from occurring in the future. These agreements included
the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the Geneva Convention, and the

1967 Protocol. In addition to bringing the plight of refugees to the forefront of the

international conscience, these agreements helped to establish universally observed

3

standards in order to ensure that all refugees were entitled to the same basic rights,
including the right to seek asylum when faced with persecution in their homelands.
Theoretically, these international agreements should have established

overarching guidelines around which governments could have crafted their own

nation’s policies regarding the treatment of refugees. However, it is clear that this is

not the case amongst the signatory countries, most notably in Sweden and Germany

during the height of the Bosnian War. This difference thus prompts a tension, even a
paradox, which is the main subject of this study: If all countries who are party to the
aforementioned agreements are obligated to follow the same standards of refugee
treatment, then what accounts for the vastly different refugee experiences with
regards to integration and inclusivism in Sweden and Germany?

My research has revealed that there are many complex reasons as to why

refugees had different experiences in Sweden and Germany. In addition to

differences in codified citizenship laws, the ability/willingness of government
institutions to provide resources for refugees, and the influence of non-state

organizations such as the media and charitable groups, the differentials in treatment
of refugees can also be explained by the unique political and social histories of

Germany and Sweden as well as by specific national goals and priorities. To add
another dimension of complexity, my research also suggests that the lived
experiences of Bosnian refugees were not necessarily contingent upon

institutionalized and governmental support systems. Rather, refugees who reported
feeling satisfied with their new lives cited the support they received from their local
communities and the public at large as a key part of their integrative experience.

4

Although my capstone is centered on two specific case studies, the lessons learned
from them are invaluable when discussing the wider implications of incorporating
humanitarian standards in international laws and agreements.
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Introduction

The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 plunged the Balkan Peninsula into a

bloody and genocidal war for much of the last decade of the 20th century. Some of
the worst atrocities of the war were perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a

multiethnic area of the former Yugoslavia inhabited by Bosnian Serbs (31.2% of
population), Bosnian Croats (17.4%), and Muslim Bosniaks (43.5%), as well as
multiple other groups. After the Muslim and Croat majority population held a

referendum in 1992 declaring its independence, the Bosnian Serb population,
supported by Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic, mobilized its troops inside
Bosnian territory in order to secure Serbian territorial strongholds. War soon

spread throughout the entire country, and was marked by horrors such as ethnic

cleansing and the systematic rape of tens of thousands of mostly Bosniak women. It

is currently estimated that up to 100,000 people were killed in the Bosnian War, and
up to 2.2 million were displaced. 1 Such levels of devastation had not been seen on
the European continent since World War II.

Although the fighting was largely confined to the Balkan Peninsula, the

intensity of the war caused hundreds of thousands of Bosnian refugees to pour into

central and northern Europe to escape persecution. While virtually every European
country opened their borders to these refugees, this paper will focus specifically on
Bosnian refugees in Germany and Sweden, which received the greatest numbers of

William S Walker, German and Bosnian Voices in Times of Crisis, (Indianapolis: Dog
Ear Publishing, 2010), 2.
1
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displaced people, respectively. As of June of 1996, the year after the Bosnian War
officially concluded, there were 345,000 displaced Bosnians living in Germany.

Today, fewer than 10,000 of these refugees remain in Germany. Between 1991 and
1996, Sweden welcomed nearly 80,000 Bosnians into the country; over 56,000
remain there.

Many European states, including Germany and Sweden, shape the framework

for their national refugee policies based on the tenets of various international

agreements, such as the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions, the 1967 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the UNCHR 1992 mandate. Theoretically,

such a similar basis for constructing national refugee policy should yield similar
results as to how individual UN member states receive and treat their refugee

populations. This does not hold true when examining the policies of Germany and

Sweden during the Bosnian War, since these two countries approached and handled
the “Bosnian refugee crisis” very differently. If all UN member states follow and

accept the same international laws and conventions regarding refugees, then what

accounts for the differentials in how the Swedish and German governments treated
displaced Bosnians? In this paper I examine possible historically and legally

informed differences between Sweden and Germany that could account for these
discrepancies. I ask the following questions: What are the national attitudes

regarding citizenship and who should possess it? What kinds of national

institutions, or lack thereof, are there to help facilitate refugee social incorporation?
How did media representations of Bosnian refugees influence their experiences in
these countries?

9

While there are almost certainly myriad factors that contributed to national

refugee policy making and refugee experiences, this paper will focus on examining
the proposed discrepancy within the boundaries of these questions. These three
domains – citizenship, national institutions, and media – serve as clear points of
comparison for Germany and Sweden, as nation’s citizenship policies, the

expansiveness of institutions that foster integration, and media construction of

social reality and public sentiment are often reflective of specific national histories
and state attitudes toward issues surrounding immigration and inclusivism. I will
now turn to these complicated and converging historical, legal and media forces,
practices, and processes.
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Chapter 1: Background and the Bosnian War
Perhaps the most popular stance on the cause of the war in the Balkans was

that it was a war fueled by ethnic tensions. When the map of Europe was redrawn
following the post World War I breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was
decided to make a state specifically for the Southern Slavs – hence the name

‘Yugoslavia.’ Convention holds that the root of the most recent conflict in the 1990s
was due in large part to Serbian aggression and to the inability of the Yugoslavian
government to control tensions between ethnic Serbians, Croats, and Bosnian

Muslims (Bosniaks) – that it was only a matter of time before ethnic tensions boiled
over and culminated in a brutal war. 2

While ethnic hatred certainly played a role in the Bosnian War, there are

other theories that maintain that the causes of the war were much more complex.
Susan Woodward asserts in her book Balkan Tragedy that the war in Bosnia was
anything but inevitable. Prior to Yugoslavia’s “rapid disintegration,” the “relative
prosperity, freedom to travel and work abroad, and landscape of multicultural

pluralism that Yugoslavs enjoyed were the envy of eastern Europeans.” 3 Despite this
optimism for the future and positive outlook toward multiculturalism, Yugoslavia

completely unraveled and was plunged into conflict within three years of the fall of
the Berlin Wall. Instead of ascribing to the conventional school of thought that the

war was caused solely due to ethnic tensions, Woodward discusses the crisis in the

Balkans in the context of the larger international political framework by placing it as
Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War,
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 3.
3 Ibid, 1.
2
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just one piece of “a more widespread phenomenon of political disintegration” in the
immediate post-Cold War order. 4 In addition, Woodward also places some

responsibility for the conflict at the feet of big powers, including the United States
and many of the nations of Western and Central Europe. She claims that these

nations had a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict in Bosnia,
and were thus ill equipped and ill prepared to address it accordingly. 5 One camp
(composed of the U.S. and Germany) held that the war was mainly a product of
Milosevic-led Serbian aggression, while the other (composed of Western and

Northern European countries) believed it was “a civil war based on the revival of

ethnic tensions after the fall of communism” with responsibility belonging to both
Croats and Serbs. 6 Different views on the origins of the war ultimately led to

disagreements on how to address it, thus prolonging the development of an effective
plan of action. The United States and its supporters were mainly concerned with
preserving the international order and stability; they opposed the breakup of

Yugoslavia and recognizing the new territorial partitions. 7 However, countries such
as Britain and France were more worried about what the implications of the
Bosnian War were in more concrete terms: refugee flows. 8

Woodward also suggests that nationalist leaders, such as Serbia’s Slobodan

Milosevic and Croatia’ Franjo Tudjman were responsible for artificially creating an
environment that allowed for ethnic tensions to take the political center stage. By
Ibid, 3.
Ibid.
6 Ibid, 7.
7 Ibid, 8.
8 Ibid, 9.
4
5
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doing so, these leaders were able to manipulate feelings of nationalism and ethnic

pride in order to achieve their own political goals. This deliberate change in policy

was evident before the war in Bosnian even began. In April 1987, the “Serbian part
shifted tactics by adopting the increasingly nationalist language of critical

intellectuals and issues of popular protest within the republic.” 9 Milosevic was able
to effectively mobilize feelings of Serbian nationalism and superiority by “playing

directly and personally to the crowd.” 10 V.P. Gagnon’s book The Myth of Ethnic War

supports this theory. Gagnon claims that elites like Milosevic instituted this strategy
with the goal of “silencing, marginalizing, and demobilizing” those who challenged
their political power. 11 Thus, Gagnon asserts, “the wars and violence seen in the

1990s were thus not the expression of grassroots sentiments in the sites of conflict.
Rather, violence was imposed on plural communities from outside those
communities…as a part of a broader strategy of demobilization.” 12

The results of this policy were most clearly seen in the region of Bosnia-

Herzegovina. Bosnia has been a “multi-ethnic crossroads” of the Serb and Croat

identities for centuries, as well as a political and religious battleground. 13 By the

middle of the sixteenth century, nearly half of Bosnians had converted to Islam, due

to the influence of the occupying Ottoman Empire. 14 Because of Bosnia’s history as a
religious and ethnic crossroads, leaders like Milosevic were able to exacerbate

Ibid, 90.
Ibid, 91.
11V.P. Gagnon, Jr. The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s, (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2004), xv.
12 Ibid.
13 Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 29.
14 Ibid, 32.
9

10
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tensions in this region when Yugoslavia was in the process of breaking up in 199091. Many Muslims and Croats in Bosnia, as well as Croats living in the country now
known as Croatia, interpreted Milosevic’s attitude regarding Serbian expansion as

quite dangerous; many began to fear for their survival as ethnic groups and for the
survival of the state. Tensions came to a head in Bosnia because Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats did not want to live in a Milosevic-led, Serb dominated

Yugoslavian state. Concurrently, Bosnian Serbs did not want to become part of what
they perceived would become “Muslim Bosnia” and lose ties with Milosevic’s proSerbia government. 15

When the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, who composed forty-four and

seventeen percent of Bosnia’s population respectively, voted in favor of an

independence referendum in February 1992 the Bosnian Serbs in Parliament

refused to accept this outcome. 16 Despite this internal refusal of recognition and

promises of boycott from Bosnian Serbs, independence was officially declared on

March 3, 1992. International recognition of independence came in early April of the
same year; the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina officially joined the United

Nations as its own entity in May 1992. 17 Keeping with their promises, the Serbian
breakaway group of the Bosnian Parliament, known as the “Assembly of the Serb

People of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” adopted a declaration in January 1992, which

proclaimed the existence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 18 This
Ibid, 40.
Ibid.
17 United Nations, "United Nations Member States."
http://www.un.org/en/members/.
18 Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 61.
15
16

14

Assembly proceeded to endorse the idea of creating a separate Serbian state in

areas with Serbian ethnic majorities within the state of Bosnia. It was written into
the Constitution of the new Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that its
borders would include “the territories of the Serbian Autonomous Regions and

Districts and of other Serbian ethnic entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including
the regions in which the Serbian people remained in the minority due to the

genocide conducted against it in World War II." 19 The Serbian Republic then

changed its name to the Republika Srpska. In response to these threatening shows
of Serbnationalism, the Bosnian Croat community, with the support of the ruling
party led by President Tudjman in Croatia, came together to form the Croatian

Community of Herzeg-Bosnia. 20 By the middle of 1992, it was clear that Bosnia

would serve as the platform on which these politically manipulated ethnic tensions
would play out. The proverbial lines in the sand had been drawn between Serbian

and Croatian nationalist leaders. However, the group who arguably had the most to
lose was Bosnia’s Muslim (Bosniak) majority population who had gotten firmly
stuck in the middle.

The war in Bosnia was partially driven due to the ideas Serb and Croat

nationalist leaders held about territory possession. Convention held that wherever
there was a Serb, then that land was a part of Serbia; wherever there was a Croat,

that land was a part of Croatia. 21 Muslims did not fit into this equation. Given that

both Serbs and Croats (and Muslims) lived in Bosnia, given these conflicting ideas
"Constitution of Republika Srpska."
http://www.vijecenarodars.net/materijali/constitution.pdf.
20 Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 62.
21 Ibid, 45.
19

15

and claims about nations and “their” territory, it became a fairly obvious place for a
conflict to break out. 22 Serbia framed their war against Croatia using language that
harkened back to World War II; Milosevic sought to portray Croatia as the

aggressor, and that Serbia was fighting against “Greater Germany pile driving its

way to the Adriatic with the help of wartime allies.” 23 Although Serbia viewed itself

as on the defensive against an aggressor, Bosnian Muslims who were on the

reciprocal end of wartime atrocities viewed Serbia’s “psychodramatic revenge as

not being wreaked upon stronger Croatian opponents, but on the one people Serbs

knew they could cut through like a knife in butter – unarmed Muslims.” 24 Of the 407
camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina investigated by the UN Commission of Experts in the
later years of the war, nearly two-thirds of them were run by Serbs. 25 The

committee found that “while no wrong doing could be identified in the detention

camps operated by Croats or Bosnian Muslims, the Serbian camps were instruments
of state policy of ‘ethnic purification’ through terror and genocide.” 26 According to

Cohen, the Serbian camps were reminiscent of the Nazi camps of a half-century

earlier, in that the war crimes perpetrated in them were “systemically and centrally
orchestrated.” 27

Ibid, 42.
Ibid, 43.
24 Ibid.
25 Philip J. Cohen, “The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals in the Genocide in the
1990s,” in This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, ed. Thomas
Cushman and Stjepan G. Mestrovic (New York: New York University Press, 1996),
52.
26 Cohen, “Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals,” 53.
27 Ibid, 53.
22
23
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Despite the fact that this war was driven by the political machinations of a

few elites, the leaders were successfully able to cause language of ethnic hatred to
permeate the population. For example, a large portion of Serbian vitriol was

directed toward Muslim Bosniaks. While the “Croats drove a mixture of fear, hatred,
and respect into the Serbs,” Muslims were another matter entirely. 28 Researcher
and journalist Ed Vulliamy, who conducted fieldwork and interviews behind the
frontlines of the Serbian army, reported that Serb soldiers regularly referred to

Muslims as “gypsies, filth, and animals.” 29 To further dehumanize Muslim Bosniaks,
the Republika Srpska greatly exaggerated the threat of an Islamic jihad in

southeastern Europe. What is particularly ironic about this claim is that before the

war, Bosnian Muslims were not particularly observant. Prior to 1992, and due to the
combined effects of socialist ideologies and local traditional practices, mosque

attendance in Bosnia was at approximately three percent. 30 In response to wartime
time religious persecution, however, pockets of more radical and rigorous Islam

popped up throughout Bosnia. The war even attracted Arab fighters from the Middle
East, which in turn sped up the radicalization process of some young Bosnian

fighters. 31 Radicalized youths and Arab fighters joined together to form the Muslim

Armed Forces. However, this group was widely loathed by the majority of Bosnians

Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, 46.
Ibid.
30 Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1995), 205.
31 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 356-357.
28
29
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and the mainstream Bosniak army, as it tried to force ideas of Islamic
fundamentalism on what was a largely secular population. 32

Prior to the war, many Bosniaks had not framed their identities around being

a Muslim; rather, many youths considered themselves to be products of Yugoslav
and western European culture. According to Vulliamy’s research, youths were all
but forced to adopt a new perspective, if only for the sake of survival. One young

man relayed to Vulliamy that he “never thought of himself as a [religious] Muslim.
He didn’t know how to pray, and he never went to mosque.” Despite this, the war

and persecution had caused him to view himself in a new, unwanted light. He had
been all but forced to think of himself as a part of the Muslim people, because he
“had to understand what it was about him and his people that they wished to

obliterate.” 33 The community in which hundreds of thousands of Bosniaks had lived
for centuries had suddenly become extremely hostile toward them.

“Ethnic cleansing” was the next step in the hostilities directed against

Bosnian Muslims following the carving up of territory by the Republika Srpska. In
1992, Serbian General Mladic led his army across eastern Bosnia like “a grim

combine harvester,” displacing and sometimes killing nearly 104,000 Muslims. 34

During this early stage of the war, Muslims tried to join forces informally to defend

their towns from the Serbian army. They were chased away by a band Bosnian-Serb
civilians bent on carrying out the army’s mission; they fittingly called themselves

the “Serbian Volunteer Army.” In order to aid the Republika Srpska Army with the
Bringa, Being Muslim, 232.
Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, 42.
34 Ibid, 88.
32
33
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“cleansing” process, the group would first march into a Muslim town to “wreak the
first rounds of horror” by setting fires and throwing grenades. The army would
follow to remove and transport remaining civilians to transit camps; the death
squads came in the last wave to ‘mop up’ those who had resisted. 35

In the early stages of the war, the most ferocious ethnic cleansing occurred in

the towns that the Republika Srpska had declared to be under the jurisdiction of the
autonomous ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ Between 150 and 200
homes, mosques, and Muslim businesses were being burned per day, creating a

steady flow of refugees to Croatia. The UNCHR called this “the most serious refugee
crisis since the Second World War.” 36 At this point, the true extent of the ethnic

cleansing program and Serbia’s plan to exterminate Bosnia’s Muslim population was
not well known to the rest of the world. Stories of the horrific, genocidal treatment

of Muslims were beginning to trickle out of Bosnia with the refugees who had fled to
Croatia. 37 Unbeknownst to the United States and the nations of western and
northern Europe, the worst was yet to come.

The stories that have emerged from the concentration camps in western

Bosnia can be thought of as modern iterations of those that have been passed down
as part of the horrific legacy of World War II. Unlike World War II, however, the

existence of these camps was known to the west. The Serbian Army preferred to call

these camps, like Omarska and Trnopolje, ‘investigation centers.’38 Although Serbian
Ibid.
Jeanne Haskin, Bosnia and Beyond: The "Quiet" Revolution That Wouldn't Go
Quietly, (New York: Algora Publishing, 2006), 74.
37 Haskin, Bosnia and Beyond, 76.
38 Ibid, 103.
35
36
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officials widely proclaimed to journalists that the camps served as holding and

investigation centers for men accused of being members of the Government Army,
the accounts of the prisoners reveal a much more grim and inhumane reality.

Although Serbian army officers and government officials attempted to maintain a

semblance of transparency by allowing western journalists, like Ed Vulliamy, into

the camps, they were only able to view select areas. For instance, Vulliamy and his
colleagues were not permitted to see buildings where civilian prisoners were

reportedly being held. It is now known that Omarska and other camps were places
of “savage killing, torture, humiliation, and barbarous cruelty.” 39 The Muslims and

Croats in the camps were often deprived of food and water for days on end, were
randomly selected for beatings and executions, and were subsequently forced to
clean up the blood of their fellow prisoners following nights of mass murder. 40

Although the west was able to forge an agreement with Serbia to close some

of the camps, some, such as Trnopolje, remained open for months after the mutually
agreed international deadline mainly due to two factors. First, other European

countries refused or were unable to take in a sufficient number of Muslim and Croat
refugees. There was essentially no where for the prisoners to go; not all of the

hundreds of thousands who had been encamped were able to start their lives anew
in Western Europe. Returning home was out of the question for most. The

conditions in eastern Bosnian communities in the Podrinje region were still

incredibly hostile to former Muslim residents. Those who did attempt to return once
the camps were ‘opened’ and prisoners were ‘free to go’ were often murdered on
39
40

Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, 110.
Ibid, 110.
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the spot by Serbs who had taken over the town. Others found that all their

belongings had been looted, or that their homes had been destroyed or were being
occupied by Bosnian Serb civilians. 41 The Muslims and Croats who had not been

rounded up for the camps were also desperate to leave Bosnia and the murderous
Serbian regime. Organizations such as the Red Cross were simply not equipped to

find places abroad for all prisoners and refugees during the early years of the war.
By the end of 1992, a United States Senate investigative report concluded that
Muslims had been ‘cleansed’ from nearly seventy percent of Bosnia. 42

By the summer of 1992, 1.8 million Bosnians had been “driven from their

homes, killed or gone missing; those alive were on the move…the biggest forced

movement of people in Europe since the Reich.” 43 More than half of these displaced

persons remained in Bosnia; nearly 350,000 others had been taken in as refugees by
Croatia. 44 The Croatian government claimed that it was at its breaking point, and
could not logistically accept any more refugees. It appealed to other, wealthier

European nations to help take some of the burden. While Croatia would continue to
offer transit visas to help Bosnian refugees get to their final destination, it was no
longer able to offer refugees places to stay. 45 As a result of this, a handful of

European countries hesitantly opened their doors to refugees.

By mid-August of 1992, Germany reported legally receiving 135,000

refugees, and admitted that another 65,000 were in the country illegally. Hungary
Ibid, 114.
Bringa, Being Muslim, 225.
43 Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, 125.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
41
42
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accepted 54,000, but then announced that its borders were closed. Austria took

50,000, and Sweden took 44,000. Other Western Europeans managed to take in a
few thousand refugees each, while Turkey only managed to accept 7,000 of their
“desperate co-religionists.” 46 The discovery of the horrors taking place in the

‘reception’ and ‘investigative centers’ further complicated the issue, as Serbia
offered to free their prisoners if international agencies would take on the

responsibility of finding them somewhere to go. This forced the UNCHR to either

“condemn the inmates to further detention” in horribly inhumane conditions or to
“facilitate the Serbian goal of ethnic cleansing” by removing the prisoners from
Serbian territory. 47

After three years of ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, mass rape, and

over 100,000 deaths, the war in Bosnia concluded in December 1995 with the

signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. Not only did these atrocities permanently alter

the geopolitical landscape of Bosnia, but they were also the root causes of the largest
European refugee crisis in the second half of the twentieth century. Hundreds of

thousands of asylum seeking refugees streamed out of the Balkan Peninsula, and

into Central, Northern, and Western Europe. As of June 1996, Germany and Sweden
respectively had the largest populations of Bosnian refugees. Germany’s number
had increased from 135,000 in 1992 to 345,000; Sweden’s had increased from
44,000 to 122,000. 48 Although the war had officially ended, Bosnia was still a

Ibid, 157.
Ibid, 158.
48 Simon Bagshaw, "Benchmarks or Deutschmarks? Determining the Criteria for the
Repatriation of Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina," International Journal of
Refugees, 9, no. 4 (1997): 566.
46
47

22

volatile place that was not safe for all of the refugees to return. This left Germany

and Sweden with a critical question – what was the best way to address the refugee
crisis, both in the short and long term?

23

Chapter 2: International Refugee Law
The Bosnian War created a security and refugee crisis on a scale unseen in

Europe since World War II. Not only did this war forever alter the population

landscape of the former Yugoslavia, but it also placed pressures on many of the

surrounding countries to help ease the burden of refugee flows, including Germany
and Sweden. International refugee law and especially who can legally qualify as a
refugee has been a relatively fluid subject of debate since the early twentieth

century and the interwar period. In addition to this, many countries have an ongoing
internal debate regarding what status and rights refugees should have once they
have been resettled. Theoretically, these states have similar frameworks for

accepting refugees, which are based on adopted international laws such as the 1951
Convention on the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Convention (the New York

Protocol), and the UNHR 1992 Mandate. 49 Before examining what accounts for the

differences in Germany and Sweden’s refugee policies, it is first necessary to explore
the similarities and foundational backbones of the conventions that have driven
policy adoption.

At the conclusion of World War II, Europe was faced with the problem of how

to organize the return of the millions of people that had been displaced or deported
from their native countries due to wartime atrocities. While the Allies had set up
temporary organizations such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation

While the status quo of international refugee law has been shaped by many
different organizations over numerous decades and is the result of countless
international agreements, this chapter will be focusing on the three agreements that
are the most relevant in terms of German and Swedish policies toward Bosnian
refugees.
49
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Administration, marginal efforts were unable in either scale or jurisdiction to

sufficiently address the scope of the refugee issue. It was clear that the international
community was in need of a more permanent and collaborative organization to lead
the way in assisting current and future refugee populations. 50 The International
Refugee Organization was born in 1947, “as a specialized agency of the United

Nations to deal with the residual problem of refugees.” 51 Its main objective was the

resettlement of refugee populations, and it was the first organization to

comprehensively address “every aspect of refugee problems: registration,
determination of status, repatriation, resettlement, and legal and political

protection.” 52 However, the IRO’s activities were short-lived; its operations ceased
in 1951 due to lack of support from some states in the UN community. The

organization came under fire by states that did not support resettlement as a

strategy for dealing with refugees. The IRO was also severely underfunded due to
this lack of unanimous support, as it was funded by only eighteen of the fifty-four

member states. 53

Thus far, international organizations had been unsuccessful in establishing

permanent protocols and organizations designed to help refugees. The Cold War

political divisions that descended across the globe made coming to an international
agreement all the more difficult. However, it was also realized that international

action and cooperation were needed to successfully address the issues that current
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and future refugee flows would bring. From 1947-1949, heated debates took place
in the UN between member states who favored a refugee organization that

possessed “broad responsibility” and those who favored “an agency with limited
competence.” 54 Ultimately, it was decided that the new organization’s primary

obligation would be the protection of refugees, as opposed to the repatriation or
resettlement of refugees, which were more politically charged concepts. In

December 1949, the UN General Assembly voted to establish the UNHCR for a trial
period of three years. The organization was to act as a “subsidiary organ” of the

General Assembly with an elected High Commissioner. As the organization proved
to be successful, its temporal and subject jurisdictions were expanded by later

General Assembly resolutions. 55 The precedent of international cooperation that

was set within the UN by the establishment of the UNCHR paved the way for future
collaborative efforts in crafting the 1951 Convention two years later.

Prior to the 1951 Convention, discussion about how to categorize refugees

centered around three different theories and outlooks: juridical, social, and the

individual. 56 In the interwar years, refugees were defined by their personal status in
relationship to a larger group’s status; that is, people were considered refugees only
when they belonged to a specific group who was being denied de jure protection by
its government. 57 In the four years immediately preceding World War II, the

juridical perspective on defining refugees gave way to the social perspective, in
which refugees were defined as “helpless casualties of broadly based social or
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political occurrences which separate them from their home society.” 58 This

approach was adopted in an effort to include those who had lost the de facto

protection of their home state, as opposed to just the legal protection. The third

phase of development for defining international refugees evolved in the post-World
War II arena, and is the one reflected in the 1951 Convention. Known as the

individualist perspective, this outlook was revolutionary in its “rejection of group

determination of refugee status.” 59 By this standard, a refugee is a person “in search

of an escape from perceived injustice or fundamental incompatibility with his/her
home state.” 60 No longer was a person’s refugee status contingent upon his/her
membership in relation to a marginalized group; rather, the new goal was for

individuals’ cases to be evaluated independently of specific social and political
situations.

The 1951 Convention’s definition of who qualifies as a refugee is as follows:

“Any person who, as a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951 and owing

to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or

political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to

such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to avail

himself of protection of that country; or, who, not having a nationality and being
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outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear
or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to return to it.” 61

According to international refugee law expert James Hathaway, the primary

standard of refugee status that is still used today is derived from the definition given
in the 1951 Convention. As stated by the UNHCR website, the Convention is both “ a
status and rights-based instrument and is under-pinned by a number of

fundamental principles, most notably non-discrimination, non-penalization, and
non-refoulement.” 62 The Convention calls for provisions for refugees to be

distributed equally, without discrimination “as to race, religion, or country of

origin.” 63 Perhaps the most relevant of the three aforementioned criteria for the

purposes of this paper is the principle of non-refoulement. UNHCR considers this

stipulation to be “so fundamental that no reservations or derogations may be made
to it.” 64 It states that “no one shall expel or return a refugee against his or her will,
in any manner whatsoever, to a territory where he or she fears threats to life or

freedom.” 65 In addition, the 1951 Convention maps out minimum standards that

states hosting refugees must meet, including access to courts, primary education,
work, and the provision for documentation. 66
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However, it is worth noting that although states who are party to the 1951

Convention must commit to the principle of non-refoulement, determining the

timeframe in which danger still exists for refugees in their home countries is very

much left to the discretion of the host states. According to international refugee law
expert Guy Goodwin-Gill, even though party states are required to abide by nonrefoulement through time, “that time is not and cannot be determined by any

principle of international law.” 67 It is also left to the discretion of host states to find
“durable solutions” regarding the future of its refugees, whether it be voluntary

repatriation, local integration, or resettlement in another country. 68 Insofar as a

state is required to protect its refugees, protection against “the immediate

eventuality is the responsibility of the country of first refuge.” 69 This window for
discretion is critical in examining the differences between German and Swedish

policies toward Bosnian refugees; it may be able to explain how the two nations

were able to enact drastically different policies while still remaining within the legal
confines of the 1951 Convention.

The 1967 Protocol expanded upon the 1951 Convention by eliminating the

temporal and geographical limitations, as the Convention had been drafted to

originally be applicable only to World War II crimes that had been perpetrated in

Europe. 70 According to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, as of April
2011, 144 states are party to the 1951 Convention, and 145 are party to the 1967
Protocol. Among these countries that have ratified both agreements are Germany
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and Sweden. 71 Additionally, this protocol helped to highlight the importance of the
“humane and compassionate dimensions” of international refugee law. 72 By

eliminating the original restrictions on jurisdictions that had been present in the

1951 Convention, the international community took a huge step in expanding the
number of refugees the UNHCR would be able to aid.

In 1992, the United Nations General Assembly passed additional resolutions

pertaining to Bosnian refugees due to the “grave situation” on the ground in the

Bosnia-Herzegovina. 73 Because the UN has decided in the lead-up to the passage of

the 1951 Convention that its primary obligation to refugees was to protect them via
humanitarian efforts, the General Assembly directed its 1992 concerns toward this
principle. Resolution 46/242 from the 91st plenary meeting on August 25, 1992

noted “widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring within
the territory of the former Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
including reports of mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians,

imprisonment and abuse of civilians in detention centres and deliberate attacks on
non-combatants…” 74 The UN also strongly condemned the “ethnic cleansing” that
was taking place. 75 In provisions ten and eleven of this resolution, the General
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Assembly demanded that all Bosnian refugees, deportees, and displaced persons be
“repatriated” to their homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the help of the UN and
other “international relief agencies”. These organizations were also called upon to
provide “rehabilitation” for the repatriated Bosnians. 76

After a period of non-compliance with the August resolution’s tenets, the

General Assembly issued an additional resolution, 47/121 on December 18, 1992,
which reaffirmed the “rights of all Bosnian refugees to return to their homes in

conditions of safety and honor.” 77 The Assembly also used stronger language to

condemn the actions of Serbia and Montenegro, and urged the establishment of an
international war crimes tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the atrocities

that had been committed against the Bosnian people. 78 While the 1951 Convention

and the 1967 Protocol established the framework of nations’ responsibilities toward
refugees, the 1992 UN mandates outlined the gravity of the refugee situation that
has resulted from horrors in the Bosnian War. It is within this context that the

actions of Sweden and Germany with respect to Bosnian refugees will be examined
in the coming chapters.

cleansing” involved fundamental violations of human rights, including rape and
imprisonment in concentration camps. However, the origin of ethnic cleansing
policies largely have nothing to do with ethnicity, “but rather with security national
rights to land” (Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 236-237).
76 Ibid.
77 United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 47/121." Last modified December
18, 1992.
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Chapter 3: Bosnian Refugees in Sweden
Despite being signees of the same international treaties that contain

guidelines for refugee treatment and assimilation, the lived experiences of refugees

in Sweden and Germany were markedly different from each other. This chapter and
the following one will explore possible reasons for this differentiation. While there
are likely infinite explanations for the paradox including respective national

histories and legal loopholes, here I focus on three areas of explanation in particular:
institutionalized ideas about citizenship, the influence of existing national

institutions designed to facilitate refugee incorporation, and media portrayals of the
refugees and circumstances of the Bosnian War. These three areas serve as clear

points of comparison for Germany and Sweden, as nation’s citizenship policies and
the expansiveness of institutions that foster integration are often reflective of
specific national histories and state attitudes toward issues surrounding

immigration and inclusivism. In conjunction with this, media often plays a large role
in both shaping public opinion and in transmitting general public sentiments. Media
can therefore be indicative of yet another dimension of the lived experiences of

Bosnian refugees in both Sweden and Germany. This chapter will address how these
three topics were manifested in Sweden, and the following chapter will address
these three areas as they apply to Germany.

Despite being a relatively homogenous society when compared with other

countries in Europe, Sweden has enjoyed a positive reputation over a period of
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years regarding its immigrant inclusivism. 79 As of 1990, only a couple of years

before the start of the Bosnian War, Sweden’s foreign born population, as a percent
of the whole population, stood at 9.2%. Between 1970 and 1990, this number

increased by only about two percentage points. As of 2000, following the conclusion
of the turmoil in the Balkans, the number was 11.3%. In 2012, foreign born as a

percent of the total population approached nearly 15%. 80 Given that the foreign

born population percentage was rather stagnant for the two decades between 1970
and 1990, the increase of nearly four percentage points over the course of just
twelve years (2000-2012) is indicative of the Swedish government’s outlook

regarding its responsibilities to humanitarian refugees and those seeking asylum.
Because of its expansive welfare state, Sweden has often been the recipient of

international praise for its willingness to accept immigrants and asylum seekers; the
welfare state, accompanied with attitudes of inclusivism, “provide a potential
vehicle for promoting social cohesion among various population groups.” 81

With a foreign born population of 9.2% in 1990, Sweden was significantly more
homogenous than other northern and western European countries. Today, the
portion of its population that is foreign born is more on par with many other
European nations, as Sweden has taken in large numbers of humanitarian refugees
from places like Iraq and Syria in recent years
(http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/assessing-immigrant-integration-swedenafter-may-2013-riots).
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Integration in Sweden after the May 2013 Riots." January 16, 2014.
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/assessing-immigrant-integration-swedenafter-may-2013-riots.
81 Ibid.
79

33

National Citizenship Laws and Integration

Since 2001, the criteria for an individual to be eligible for Swedish citizenship

have been enshrined in the Act on Swedish Citizenship. While this document went

into effect in the years once the Bosnian refugee flow tapered off, many tenets of this
act were crafted as a direct response to the Balkan security crisis of the 1990’s, and
the challenges it posed for Sweden – for example, figuring out how to balance its

humanitarian responsibilities and ideas of inclusivism all within the framework of a
difficult economic environment. Before analyzing the contents of the document, it is

worthwhile to consider what one of the physical properties of the document implies
– its length. While this government policy is inclusive of essentially every

circumstance under which an individual is eligible (or ineligible) for citizenship, the
document itself totals only six pages. While this characteristic doesn’t necessarily

have any significant meaning when looked at independently, when compared with
the German Nationality Act, which totals twenty-five pages, one is immediately in
the position to hypothesize that overall there are less criteria that an individual
needs to meet before he or she can be eligible for citizenship.

The 2001 Act on Swedish Citizenship was the culmination of a national

conversation about immigration, refugees, and inclusion that had taken place

throughout the mid 1990’s at the height of the Bosnian War. 82 Prior to its 21st
century makeover, the Act on Swedish Citizenship had not been updated or

revitalized since 1950. Because the large influx of refugees from Bosnia brought the

Scott McIver, “”Conceptualisations of citizenship in Sweden and the United
Kingdom” (Phd diss., University of Edinburh, 2009), 88
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problems that refugees face with regards to assimilation to the surface, the national

conversation about citizenship changed from one on how to “manage” the transition
from immigrant to citizen to a discussion that emphasized the importance of

diversity and social integration. 83 In 1996, the Swedish Parliamentary Committee

for Immigrant Policy came to the conclusion that “the key objective for immigration
policy [should be] a society where all have the same opportunities, rights, and

duties.” 84 While Sweden was willing and prepared to make reforms to their social

integration policies (i.e. housing, education, labor), it was first necessary to enshrine
these beliefs in a much more fundamental sense – by adapting citizenship criteria to
more closely mirror inclusive attitudes.

According to a statement made by Gunnar Hermansson, Director of Sweden’s

Division for Immigrant Integration and Diversity (a subdivision of the Ministry for
Integration and Gender Equality), the idea of “making it easier to gain Swedish

citizenship” and promoting legislation that was as “open and generous in permitting
citizenship as possible” received political support from major Swedish parties
throughout the late 1990’s, including the Moderate Party and the Social

Democrats. 85 One manifestation of this policy in the 2001 Act on Swedish
Citizenship is Section 8. It reads:

“An alien who has reached the age of eighteen but who is not yet twenty
acquires Swedish citizenship on notification if he or she:
Ibid, 89.
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1. holds a permanent Swedish residence permit, and

2. has been domiciled in Sweden since reaching the age of thirteen
or, if the child is stateless, fifteen.” 86

This change in policy was supremely important for deciding the futures of the

thousands of children who had arrived in Sweden alongside their parents after

fleeing the atrocities of the Bosnian War. In this situation, a child’s citizenship status
– and thus a child’s options about legally living and remaining in quite possibly the

only stable state they had ever known – was not contingent upon his or her place of

birth or the citizenship status of his or her parents. The citizenship status of children
born abroad is addressed again in Section 11 of the same document. It reads:

“An alien can apply for and be granted Swedish citizenship (be naturalized) if
he or she:

1. has provided proof of his or her identity,
2. has reached the age of eighteen,

3. holds a permanent Swedish residence permit,
4. has been domiciled in Sweden

a. for the previous two years in the case of Danish, Finnish,
Icelandic, or Norwegian citizens,

Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, "The 2001 Swedish Citizenship Act."
Last modified May 22, 2008. http://www.government.se/sb/d/3926/a/29191.
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b. for the previous four years in the case if a stateless person
or a person who is considered to be a refugee under
Chapter 4, Section 1 of the Aliens Act,

c. for the previous five years for other aliens, and

5. has led and can be expected to lead a respectable life.” 87
Although this Act stipulates a shorter domiciliary period for citizens of other

Scandinavian nations than for other aliens, a waiting period of only four years was

instituted specifically for those who held refugee status (who could provide proof of
identity. Those refugees who could not provide proof of identity had a domiciliary
period of eight years before they could be naturalized.) 88 This relatively brief

required domiciliary period is demonstrative of Sweden’s commitment to providing
an attainable path to citizenship for both underage and adult refugees. By making

the citizenship application process straightforward and easy to understand, Sweden
was able to open the door to more effective and efficient integration programs.

Sweden’s lenient attitudes toward the notion of citizenship can also be seen

in the debate over whether or not to permit dual citizenship. Professor Scott McIver,
who translated numerous Swedish government pamphlets and other sources into

English, goes into great detail as to how this national conversation surrounding dual
citizenship unfolded. Because Sweden’s population was becoming increasingly

heterogeneous, government officials felt that it was more necessary to re-evaluate

the provision of the 1950 Act on Swedish Citizenship that prohibited the possession
87
88
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of dual citizenship (that is, holding Swedish citizenship in conjunction with another
country’s citizenship). 89 “Attachment to one’s original citizenship as part of one’s
identity was seen to be arguably the most important factor in all the interplaying

elements that arise with the change of citizenship.” 90 Due to the changing nature of
Sweden’s population, many began to feel that essentially forcing immigrants to
choose between loyalty to their homeland and loyalty to their new country of

residence was not a good way of fostering feelings of integration and belonging in
immigrant communities. The Swedish Parliamentary Committee appointed to
research the relationship between dual citizenship possession and political

involvement in Sweden’s national elections found that allowing dual citizenship was
beneficial in terms of increasing suffrage. In their report (translated by Scott

McIver), the Committee argued, “for the individual, such participation can foster
integration through an enhanced feeling of belonging in Swedish society and
through grater possibilities for actively participating in political life.” 91

Because the Swedish government was able to recognize that individuals’

identity (and how they are able to subsequently express that identity) lay at the core
of citizenship and civic integration, they were able to address it in literature

distributed to new immigrants. In a 2002 pamphlet titled “Swedes from the whole
world – Choosing citizenship in the age of globalisation,” the government made a

push to emphasize that citizenship did more than secure certain legal privileges. The
pamphlet acknowledged that citizenship also had an emotional component. It
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depicted Swedes that had already been naturalized asking questions that all recent
immigrants would have been able to relate to, such as “where do I belong?” and

“where do I have my roots?” 92 The focus on weaving the concept of citizenship with

the concept of integration by permitting dual citizenship was the most fundamental
policy of Swedish legislation in this area throughout the late 1990’s and early
2000’s.

Prior to this push for dual citizenship, the Swedish government held very

different ideas as to the best methods to foster integration. While the old school of
thought in this field – which was dominant in the years before the Bosnian War –
still wanted to preserve Sweden’s multicultural landscape, there were concerns

what dual citizenship would mean for state security, which dated back to findings of
a 1985 Parliamentary Committee. This committee was concerned that dual

citizenship would cause problems with double voting, diplomatic support, military
service duties, and national loyalty. In other words, would an individual’s being a
citizen of another nation somehow undermine their commitment to the Swedish

state and Swedish values? 93 By changing its policy to permit individuals to retain

citizenship of their home countries, Sweden became more inclusive by expanding
ideas about what it meant to be Swedish. This new outlook embraced cultural
pluralism in the name of diversifying Swedish society, thus making it a more
hospitable and friendly place for newly naturalized citizens to live.

Once the criteria for determining citizenship had been expanded, it naturally

followed that Sweden needed to examine the effectiveness of their integration
92
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policies. As part of their expansive welfare state, Sweden established government

ministries and institutions specifically designed to ensure that the needs of some of
the most vulnerable members of society were met, especially those of persons who

had been traumatically displaced from their home countries, like Bosnian refugees.

The very existence of these ministries, including (but not limited to) the Ministry of
Integration and Gender Equality and the Ministry of Culture and Democracy, is
evidence of the Swedish government’s commitment to easing the transition of
immigrants into greater society. 94

In 2009, the Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality issued a fact sheet

explaining the goals of Swedish integration policy, and in what areas such policies

needed improvement. As stated in the fact sheet, the overarching goal of integration
policy “is equal rights, obligations, and opportunities for all, regardless of ethnic or
cultural background.” 95 While many different government ministries are

responsible for overseeing specific issues for the entire Swedish population,

regardless of nationality or race (e.g. the Ministry of Employment oversees the

incorporation of all Swedes into the labor market; the Swedish Public Employment

Service supports unemployed Swedes of all background), the Ministry of Integration

and Gender Equality coordinates all integration work, and regularly cooperates with
other government institutions to ensure that integration is able to occur on various
levels. 96 In addition to overseeing other government ministries, the Ministry of
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Integration and Gender Equality has responsibilities of its own, including “the

introduction of new arrivals into Sweden, helping new arrivals procure Swedish

citizenship, combating discrimination and racism, the promotion of democracy and
human rights, the development of urban districts with extensive social exclusion,
and follow-ups and evaluation in the area of integration.” 97

It is clear that the Swedish government is committed to easing the process of

integration for refugees based on its initiatives to expand citizenship, establish

government ministries to oversee integration, and its tendency to use rhetoric of
equality and inclusion. Of course, such government initiatives do not occur in a

vacuum, and are vulnerable to being thwarted and watered down once they are

introduced into reality. The following subsection will provide the background of the
economic and political context in which integration policies were implemented, as
this truly shows the complexities of policymaking.

It’s Complicated – The Relationship Between Policy and Reality

In the 1990’s, when the bulk of Bosnian refugees were arriving on Swedish

soil, Sweden was in the midst of an economic downturn, and the government was in
the process of undertaking a series of tough economic reforms in order to reduce

the deficit. 98 Although the Swedish welfare state was still one of the most extensive

in the world, according to Abiri, the benefit cuts Sweden had to make were
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“troubling” to many Swedes, as they marked the reversal of a trend of ever-

expanding welfare benefits. 99 Unemployment levels also soared during this period

to rise to levels “previously unheard of in a country aiming at ‘full employment.” 100

These social afflictions were occurring in conjunction with the start of the war in the
Balkans; from 1991 to 1992, Sweden saw its number of applications for asylum

increase from 27,000 to 84,000 (about 40,000 of these asylum seekers were actually
from Bosnia – tens of thousands of others were from other places in the former
Yugoslavia, like Kosovo). 101 Thus, tens of thousands of displaced and desperate

refugees were flooding into Sweden at the same time the Swedish economy was
experiencing a recession. The pressure that this situation placed on entities like
businesses and housing developments created an environment in which true
inclusion and integration were difficult to achieve.

One of the most crucial aspects to fostering integration among immigrants is

access to employment. Possessing a job provides immigrants the opportunities to

build relationships and networks with native citizens in the workplace; it gives them
the financial freedom to participate in various social activities, receive a better

education, and live in better neighborhoods. A study conducted by ethnologist Maja
Povrzanović Frykman in 2009 examined the attitudes of thirty-five Bosnian

refugees toward their employment prospects and paths. Although most of her

evidence is anecdotal, it is supplemented by government data, and her sample pulls
interviewees from a variety of communities (mostly urban). First and foremost,
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Frykman noted that the younger and higher educated a refugee was, the more likely
that refugee was employed. 102 Employment figures also support the statement that
immigrants had a higher probability of employment if they were trained in a

vocation as opposed to having only a general education. 103 Another important factor
in examining Bosnian refugee employment was location, as suggested by Jan Ekberg
and Mikal Ohlson in their 1997 study that focused on the employment status of

Bosnian refugees who had come to Sweden between 1993 and 1994 (translated by
Frykman). Ekberg and Ohlson found that in some municipalities, nearly 80% of
registered Bosnian refugees were employed, while in others only 10% were

employed. 104 Employment rates were higher in regions where “the economic sector
was characterized by small private enterprises.” 105

Once Bosnian refugees were settled in their new homes, their integration

was transferred into the hands of the local authorities who ran refugee introduction
programs. To prepare them for opportunities in the labor market, refugees were
entitled to a year’s worth of free Swedish language and “practice employment”
courses. 106 Despite these benefits, many refugees in Frykman’s study reported

feeling extremely disoriented throughout their initial orientation period, which
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translated to feelings of hopelessness and incompetence. 107 Refugees were further

frustrated by the fact that many of their degrees from universities in Bosnia were
non-transferrable to Swedish employers. Frykman quotes a Bosnian refugee who

had been a building engineer prior to his relocation to Sweden. When the man
reflected on the 11-year period of his taking jobs for which he was vastly

overqualified, he stated he had “lost any illusion. [He had] weakened [his] criteria.

[He] was never asked for an interview. [He] knew people who drove taxies in Malmö
that were also building engineers.” 108

At the conclusion of the Swedish language and project-employment classes,

many refugees still felt they were not sufficiently prepared to find work. Refugees’
criticism was largely directed at the Swedish Public Employment service, as many
Bosnians felt the agency was not doing enough to provide them with leads and
contacts in the labor market. 109 Of course, this negative experience with

employment was not something that applied to every Bosnian refugee. Others in

Frykman’s study spoke highly of the Public Employment Service and its employees
(who were almost always native Swedes). Some refugees credited the Public

Employment Service with opening doors to opportunities for them, which allowed

them to live “far better in Sweden than they would have in Yugoslavia.” 110 However,
when studying the attitudes of Bosnian refugees toward their employment

prospects, it is important to keep in mind the economic context of the period.

Because Sweden was undergoing a recession and unemployment numbers were
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high across the board, it is possible that many Bosnians could not find jobs as a

direct result of this situation; assuming that factors like agency incompetence, lack
of willingness to assist among the Public Employment Service employees, and

discrimination were solely responsible for these difficulties would be too big of a
leap.

There are numerous other issues that have caused it be difficult for Bosnians

to find jobs. As stated in Frykman’s interviews, many refugees were quite surprised
at the necessity of having connections and networks throughout the labor market,

whether it was to a Swede or to another refugee who was able to secure a good job.
In Bosnia, these types of connections were often closely affiliated with “customary

nepotism” that tended to occur along political lines; in turn, many Bosnians believed
that networks and connections had no place in a “law-abiding country like

Sweden.” 111 It was also difficult for refugees to start their own businesses when they
could not find work in Swedish companies. Many Bosnians reported that they did
not feel like they knew enough about business building, as the dream of owning
one’s own business was not a big part of the employment culture in Bosnia. In

addition to lack of confidence in their business skills, many refugees felt they were
not capable of starting a business that used Swedish as its primary language. 112

Even when refugees were able to find decent jobs that matched their skillsets, many
of them attributed it to being lucky by being “at the right place at the right time” in
the labor market rather than to their qualifications. 113
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Despite the challenges and downward mobility that many Bosnian refugees

confronted in the labor market, on the whole, most of Frykman’s interviewees

considered themselves to be happy and well adjusted to their new lives in Sweden.
Many of them “expressed pride at their work achievements.” 114 Even though these
achievements did not necessarily result in the same high social status the refugees
had enjoyed in Bosnia, they were proud of their ability to support themselves and
their families after starting over in a foreign country with little more than the

clothes on their backs. Refugees also reported finding hope in the bright futures of
their children, many of whom received Swedish educations from young ages. 115
Moreover, the refugees were thankful to be able to reside in a country where so

many of their friends and family members lived nearby, without the fear of being
repatriated or resettled. 116

The Impact of Housing on Inclusion

The impact of Swedish housing policies on Bosnian refugees is an additional

dimension of integration policy where reality did not meet intent. As Sweden’s rates
of immigration began to increase slowly beginning in the 1970s, so has the

percentage of the population that lives in what can be called segregated areas. As of
2008, 20% of Sweden’s foreign born population lived in an area where more than

40% of the rest of the population was foreign born. In contrast, “60 percent of native
Ibid, 79.
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Swedes lived in areas where the majority of the population was also Swedish, and
20 percent lived in areas that were virtually 100 percent Swedish.” 117 It is easy to
see how this type of segregation between native and foreign-born communities

would inhibit integration. In addition to limiting opportunities for immigrants to
form relationships and connections with native Swedes, segregated housing

inhibited networks from being established with respect to the labor market. Thus,
the lack of integration with respect to housing had a direct and negative influence
on labor market integration.

While Sweden had been experimenting with various state-directed housing

policies since the early 1960’s, it had most recently been resurrected in 1985. In

order to avoid disproportionately large concentrations of immigrants in the three
main metropolitan regions – Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö – immigrants and

refugees were placed more evenly throughout different municipalities, including in
less urban areas. 118 Due to the large influx of refugees during the Bosnian War,

housing availability became much more limited, and the dispersal policy had to be
abandoned. As a result, immigrants were placed in locations wherever there was
sufficient availability; the state of the mid-recession labor markets did not

necessarily play a role in determining placement. 119 Although immigrants were free

to relocate if they found housing elsewhere, many of them did not have the

resources to undertake this; immigrants were also required to participate in an
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eighteen month long introduction and orientation (which included aforementioned
classes in Swedish and employment practice) in the municipality in which they had
originally been placed. 120 Thus, it was all but obligatory that immigrants remained

in community in which they had been placed for eighteen months. Although the
refugees received social assistance throughout this time period, many felt the
frustrations of trying to find employment in order to secure their future.

It is worth noting that dispersion policies were slightly different for those

who entered Sweden as asylum seekers, as was the case with many Bosnian

refugees. Asylum seekers were permitted to settle in any municipality they wished,

and many chose to live where they already had friends or family who had arrived in
previous years as economic migrants, or another type of immigrant. 121 However,
because the recession was in full swing during the Bosnian War, many asylum

seekers were settling in areas were employment was already in short supply; this
compounded integration and employment difficulties. Another effect of refugees

being able to self-select their settlement location was that because their decision

was often based on the location of friends and family of the same ethnic background,
refugees were unknowingly segregating themselves from native communities and

from the job opportunities that came with having connections with native Swedes.
Despite efforts to try to disperse immigrants and refugees, ultimately many

were compelled to live in areas where there was the most availability. Due to the

Miljonprogram (Millions Program) that was started by the Social Democratic Party
in 1964, most of the availability was in the three main metropolitan centers – the
120
121
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same three cities that the government initially did not want to overload with refugee
populations. The Miljonprogram was “an ambitious public housing program…whose
objective was to meet the growing demand for housing in urban areas, where 85%

of Sweden’s population lives.” 122 Between 1964 and 1974, over a million new homes

were constructed. Although these neighborhoods were originally home to working
class Swedes, they are now mainly occupied by “high concentrations of immigrant

origin populations.” 123 Located in the suburbs of Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö,
these neighborhoods have come to be known as betongförorter, which roughly

translates as “concrete jungle” and “immigrant ghetto.” 124 Although the existence of

segregated communities is not inherently problematic, such communities provide
huge obstacles to processes of social integration and inclusion.
The Media – The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

In addition to examining how citizenship legislation and government policies

can impact Bosnian refugee integration, it may also be useful to briefly examine how
refugees were portrayed in the media. This can provide insight into how the

Swedish population reacted to the refugee influx, what the people thought their

nation’s responsibility toward the refugees should be, and how receptive they were
in general to the Bosnian refugees. In 1990 – prior to the Bosnian War, but amidst
the collapse of the Soviet Union – the Swedish media delivered dire reports of the
Fredlund-Blomst, "Assessing Immigrant Integration in Sweden after the May
2013 Riots." January 16, 2014.
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mass migrant flows that were anticipated in the wake of the fall of the eastern

bloc. 125 Newspapers reiterated reports from “experts” who claimed that migrants

could number between 20 and 50 million; they reported on the emergency meetings
that government ministries were holding to prepare for a mass immigration of

Russians. 126 Although the storm drummed up by the media about expectations of
mass emigration from Russia never came to fruition, Sweden was faced with
another large-scale refugee crisis two years later.

The large increase in asylum seekers in the early days of the Bosnian War

caused mixed reactions throughout Sweden, as asylum applications rose from
27,000 in 1991 to 84,000 in 1992. From the beginning of the conflict, the

disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ensuing war made headline news throughout
the nation. Although much attention was paid to the political implications of the

collapse, news media provided ample coverage of the humanitarian horrors that
were occurring in Bosnia as a result of “ethnic cleansing” policies. 127 Due to the

coverage of the brutalities being committed specifically in Bosnia, on the whole, the
Swedish people were very empathetic toward Bosnians. However, when it became
public knowledge that the majority of Yugoslavian asylum seekers were coming

from Kosovo, and not Bosnia, “this fueled a national debate on the ‘genuineness’ of

Abiri, “Changing Praxis of Generosity,” 16
Ibid.
127 “Ethnic cleansing” programs were part of the larger political aims of Serbian
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asylum applicants.” 128 As a result, asylum seekers from Kosovo were “treated with
suspicion,” and the majority of them were ultimately denied asylum. 129 This

provides evidence to support the idea that the media played a large role in shaping
public perception of Yugoslav refugees. Because most of the coverage focused on
atrocities in Bosnia at the expense of what was occurring in other parts of

Yugoslavia, Sweden became more inclined to want to aid Bosnian refugees. It would
seem that sparse media coverage of events occurring in places such as Montenegro
and Kosovo was one of the many factors that worked against asylum applicants
from these locations.

Although the Swedish government and general population alike recognized

the need to assist displaced Bosnians, the media played host to a debate as to what

the best methods of assistance were. Some argued that the act of granting asylum to
Bosnian refugees could “indirectly assist the persecutors, for whom the creation of
refugees was an end in itself, and part of the strategy of ethnic cleansing.” 130

Ultimately, it was decided to grant permanent residency status to the 40,000

Bosnians who were awaiting asylum decisions, while people from other areas of

Yugoslavia were granted temporary protection that lasted six months, or were not
granted protection at all. This strategy is representative of Sweden’s concern for
those who were being actively persecuted, and how they wished to honor their

humanitarian responsibilities while still maintaining a relatively strict quota for
other refugee and immigrant populations.

Abiri, “Changing Praxis of Generosity,” 19.
Ibid.
130 Ibid, 20.
128
129

51

Conclusion

For decades, Sweden has enjoyed a reputation throughout the world for

having a generous and inclusive refugee policy. This policy is reflected in numerous

ways, including in citizenship legislation and government social policies. With a goal
of making it more attainable for refugees to receive citizenship, the 2001 Act on
Swedish Citizenship was reformed. Some reforms included making it easier for

children of refugees to obtain citizenship, requiring a shorter waiting period for
adult refugees, and the allowance for people to hold dual citizenship. Sweden’s

policies to provide Bosnian refugees with opportunities to begin their lives over

again are also representative of the government’s desire to foster inclusivism and

integration. In addition to providing guidance in the labor and housing markets, the
government also provided refugees with classes in the Swedish language and
employment practice.

Despite these good intentions, these policies were not as successful once they

were implemented. Because of other factors like an economic recession and pre-

existing housing segregation, Bosnian refugees were not presented with as many
opportunities to integrate as government officials had once hoped. Although

coverage in the media helped to bring attention and sympathy to the plight of the
refugees, many government policies ultimately fell short. Regardless of the

limitations that reality presented to integration policies, many refugees reported
feeling satisfied with their new lives in Sweden. Although policies were not as

effective as initially planned, the stability that living in Sweden with legal residency
52

status provided coupled with the good intent behind the policies helped to make
many refugees feel relatively welcome and comfortable.
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Chapter 4: Bosnian Refugees in Germany
Just as Sweden has historically enjoyed a positive, global reputation

regarding its immigrant and refugee policies, Germany serves as Sweden’s foil. From
the beginning of the Bosnian War in 1992, approximately 345,000 Bosnian refugees
poured into Germany to seek asylum. Although Germany and Sweden respectively
received the largest number of Bosnian refugees out of all the European Union

member states, Germany’s 345,000 more than quadrupled Sweden’s 80,000. It is
easy to imagine how such a staggering figure could place existing German

institutions and infrastructure under significant pressure. Although this chapter will
examine inclusion processes primarily through the three lenses of

conceptualizations of citizenship, institutions that foster integration, and media
representations, it is worth acknowledging that Germany’s history has had a

significant impact on the evolution of its immigration and refugee policies. Because

the implications of German history vis-à-vis the history of immigrant incorporation
is a critical piece of the puzzle, this chapter will place an emphasis on this topic by
tracing the development of the concept of German citizenship.
Politics and History of German Citizenship

Since its very inception as a nation in the mid-19th century, being “German”

has had a very specific meaning that, for most of its existence, has centered on ideas
such as nationalism and unification. Up until the 1990’s, even the opportunity to

become German was limited to those who had been born to parents who possessed

54

German citizenship and were of German ancestry. This policy, known as
Abstammungsprinzip, helped to make Germany’s citizenship

and naturalization policies the most restrictive and exclusionary in Western

Europe. 131 Throughout Western Europe, it has long been the common practice to

grant citizenship to individuals born within state territory, independent of ancestral
origins. 132

Eli Nathans, an expert on the evolution of German nationality and citizenship,

hypothesizes in his book “The Politics of Citizenship in Germany” that restrictive

exclusionary citizenship policies date back to the days of the German Confederation,
prior to the unification of the German nation. Nathans claims it is these policies that
still comprise the foundations of German citizenship as we know it today. Rogers

Brubaker, another scholar who has done extensive work on the politics of German
citizenship, points to these individual state policies as evidence that the idea of a

German nation emerged long before the idea of a single German state, whereas in
other western European nations, ideas of nationhood formed long after the state
had been politically unified. 133

In the 1830’s, each of the thirty-eight sovereign states and four free cities

within the German Confederation was responsible for crafting its own citizenship

and nationalization policies. 134 Due to the economic competition between the states,
many found it fitting and necessary to restrict granting citizenship to “desirable
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immigrants,” or those immigrants whom governments felt would ultimately

contribute to the economic well being of state. Often, immigrants who could not
prove that they had “sufficient resources” to support themselves or practiced a

trade from which the state could benefit were denied citizenship on the grounds
that they may one day be in need of poor relief. 135 In addition to restricting

citizenship on an economic basis, many German states historically excluded certain
national and ethnic groups, specifically Poles and Jews.

In order to develop concrete examples of these exclusionary policies,

Nathans focuses on Prussian naturalization and citizenship laws, as Otto von

Bismarck unified Germany under Prussian leadership and legal codes in 1871. He

points to the 1842 Prussian law known as the Untertanengesetz, which highlighted
descent from a Prussian father as the basis for “transmission of Prussian

citizenship.” 136 This law also required that members of the nobility pledge their

allegiance to the Prussian state, and forsake nationalist ties with any other German

state (it is easy to see how this parallels contemporary debates over permitting dual

citizenship). Although there were some failed, localized movements that cropped up
during the revolutions of 1848 that attempted to liberalize citizenship laws, these
ideas largely petered out along with the movements themselves. 137

Following unification in 1871, Otto von Bismarck expanded the foundations

of Prussia’s citizenship policies to the rest of the states in what was now known as
Germany; he proceeded to institute even more “explicitly ethnically exclusionary
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policies,” which Nathans attributes to a combination of factors related to Bismarck’s
personal political beliefs, including his “calculations about national interest, his

defense of authoritarian political institutions, and his combative personality.” 138 As
a result, he put into effect increasingly discriminatory policies against Jews, Poles,

Czechs, Danes, and even native-born German women. Such narrow ideas of what it
meant to be a German citizen were at the core of the 1913 Nationality Act, and

reigned supreme throughout the World War I and imperialistic era. Following a

defeat in World War I and a transition from an imperial government to a republic,
German citizenship policy proved to be reactionary, and became even more

xenophobic. For example, Prussia imposed a ten-year residency requirement for
citizenship in 1920, only to increase it to a fifteen-year period in 1921. 139

While ethnicity and race had always been integral, determining factors for

obtaining German citizenship, the Nazi regime that came to power in the 1930’s

made those features the sole foundation of citizenship criteria. Because the Nazis’

mission of creating a “superior Aryan race” depended on the government’s ability to
control what people were considered Germans, citizenship and naturalization laws

became one of the central focuses of the regime. Rather than continue the policies of
decades past that focused on both ancestral origin and economic potential as

citizenship criteria, the Nazis created rigid racial hierarchies. These hierarchies
became “the guiding markers of citizenship and naturalization because they

determined who would be accepted, who would be tolerated, and who needed to be
138
139
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eliminated from the German nation.” 140 These fabricated hierarchies were very
much the product of 19th century racial theories born out of “scientific racism.”

However, they were the guiding principles in determining citizenship status. Those

with “full German blood” were deemed Reichsbü rger and therefore had more

political rights, while those classified as Staatsangehörige had second-class

status. 141 The Nazis also used their new hierarchies to justify revoking citizenship
on a scale never before seen.

Although both the governmental and social frameworks of post-war

Germany have been reflective of the atrocities perpetuated throughout World War II
(as well as deep-seated hatred of Nazi policies), many of the policies regarding

citizenship remained unchanged for decades. Although German citizenship was
restored to those who had been cruelly stripped of it, naturalization policies

remained centered on having Germanic ancestry. It was not until the late 1990’s, in
the wake of the Bosnian refugee crisis and increased movement between the
European nations in general, that these policies were finally liberalized.

While this type of exclusivism in terms of citizen in-groups and out-groups

was at its height under the Third Reich, much of the body of the German Nationality
Act that remains in force today has its origins dating back to 1913. In fact, the

physical Act remained largely unchanged until it was amended in 2000, which

loosened the criteria by which an individual could obtain German citizenship for the
first time in seventy-seven years. The act underwent subsequent amendments in
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2005, 2007, and 2014. 142 Although the channels through which a foreigner may

acquire German citizenship have undergone an opening within the last decade and a
half, Bosnian refugees arrived on German soil at a time in which foreigners, asylum
seekers included, had little recourse to find a way to remain in Germany on a
permanent basis.

According to Germany’s Federal Foreign Office and to the German Nationality

Act, since 2000, children born in Germany to non-German parents “automatically

acquire German citizenship if one parent has been legally resident in Germany for at
least eight years and has a permanent right of residence.” 143 This is found in Section

4(3) of the German Nationality Act:

3) A child of foreign parents shall acquire German citizenship by birth in

Germany if one parent

1. has been legally ordinarily resident in Germany for eight years and

2. has been granted a permanent right of residence or as a national of

Switzerland or as a family member of a national of Switzerland possesses a

residence permit on the basis of the Agreement of 21 June 1999 between the
European Community and its Member States on the one hand and the Swiss

German Federal Foreign Office, "Law on Nationality." Last modified December
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Confederation on the other hand on the free movement of persons (Federal
Law Gazette 2001 II p. 810). 144

Despite the advances this law made, it is worth noting that many children born

to foreign parents under such circumstances also acquired the citizenship of their
parents. Once that child reached twenty-three years of age, the newly established
“option model”(Optionspflicht) became applicable. As detailed in a booklet

circulated prior to when the amended Nationality Act went into effect, the “option
model” is described as follows:

“Persons who become Germans by right of birth and who at the same time acquire
the nationality of their parents, must after attaining the age of majority and at the
latest by their 23rd birthday opt for one nationality:

• Where they make a declaration to the effect that they wish to retain foreign

citizenship, they will lose German citizenship. The same will apply where
they have not made any declaration by their 23rd birthday.

• Where they decide in favour of German citizenship, they will need as a matter of
principle to furnish evidence by their 23rd birthday that they have lost the

other citizenship.

• Where giving up the other citizenship is not possible or cannot reasonably be

expected, multiple nationality can be accepted. In this case, an application for
retention of the other nationality must be made by the 21st birthday, even if

144German
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at that point in time it is still not clear whether proceedings for release from
that nationality might not after all be successful.

The young persons in question will be informed about the option model by the
authorities on attainment of the age of majority.” 145

In other words, children born to foreign parents in Germany were not permitted

to hold dual citizenship after the age of twenty-three. If a child wished to retain the

privileges of German citizenship, then he or she was compelled to relinquish the

citizenship of their parents’ homeland, and vice versa. Dual citizenship remained a
legal impossibility in Germany until the Second Act Amending the Nationality Act
went into force on December 20, 2014. 146 Otto Schily, Federal Minister of the

Interior, encapsulated the monumental nature of this amendment with respect to
feeling of integration and belonging in his foreword to the booklet containing the
new "Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht," or nationality law. Published in August 1999,
Schily wrote:

“At the heart of the reform is the supplementing of the traditional principle of
descent (jus sanguinis) by the acquisition of nationality by birth. For children
born in Germany of foreign parents, this makes it easier for them to identify
with their home country of Germany. They are given the chance to grow up
as Germans among Germans.”
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“Enshrined in the new Act is a further important opportunity for integration:
the shortening of the naturalisation period for foreigners who have lived in
Germany for a long time. Since integration is not a one-way street, this

opportunity entails certain minimum requirements. Anyone wishing to live

permanently in Germany must respect our constitution and our legal system.
It also goes without saying that he or she will have to learn German.

Integration can only succeed where there is a will on both sides – among
Germans and among the foreigners living in Germany.

Admittedly, the new framing of German nationality law cannot bring about

integration "by order". What it does do, however, is give those fellow citizens
from abroad who live here permanently a clear sign of our care and concern
and of our resolve to foster the peaceful co-existence of all men and women,
irrespective of their cultural origin.” 147

Although this amendment did not totally eliminate the ancestry component

from citizenship requirements, the 2000 law provided an alternative means to
acquiring citizenship for those who were not born to native German parents.

However, the possibility of acquiring citizenship through birthright is still listed as
the primary means of becoming German in Section 4(1) of the Nationality Act:
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“(1) A child shall acquire German citizenship by birth if one parent possesses
German citizenship. Where at the time of the birth only the father is a
German national, and where for proof of descent under German law

recognition or determination of paternity is necessary, acquisition shall be
dependent on recognition or determination of paternity with legal effect

under German law; the declaration of recognition must be submitted or the

procedure for determination must have commenced before the child reaches
the age of 23.” 148

“Safe Third State” Law – Impact and Justification
Although recent amendments to the Nationality Act demonstrate that

German nationality and naturalization laws are starting to fall into step with their
liberal Western European counterparts, none of these reforms were extant at the

time of the Bosnian refugee influx. Because Bosnian asylum seekers had essentially
no existing path to citizenship in Germany, they had no certain legal future in the
country. In addition to being confronted with legal difficulties due to restrictive

citizenship laws, the German state’s asylum laws presented yet another obstacle to a
secure future.

Prior to 1993, Article 16a(1) of the Basic Law made it so that Germany had

one of the most generous asylum policies in Europe. It stated that, “Anybody
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prosecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right of asylum.” 149 Hundreds of
thousands of Bosnians took advantage of this generous policy and poured into

Germany, where many already had friends and family living in the country as guest
workers. 150 Once displaced Bosnians were in the country, they were permitted to

file applications for asylum. Even if asylum was not immediately granted following

the initial filing of the application with the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
(known in German by the acronym BAMF), the appeal process was lengthy, and

applicants were permitted to remain in Germany for the months or years it took for
their case to be re-examined. 151 This option ceased to exist for Bosnian refugees on

July 1, 1993, when Section 16a(2) of the Basic Law – known as the Safe Third State

principle – went into effect. This amendment represented “a fundamental shift away
from the unqualified right to seek asylum in Germany.” 152 Section 16a(2) greatly

limited the applicability of Section 16a(1) by restricting asylum applications from

those who entered Germany by way of a “safe third state.” The Amendment defines
“safe third state” as “members of the European Community, the Council of Europe,
and countries guaranteeing the application of the 1950 European Convention on

Refugees and the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees.” 153 The Bundestag even went so
far as to explicitly provide a list of countries that were classified as “safe third
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states”, which included Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Norway, Sweden,
Poland, and Switzerland. 154

Due to Amendment 16a(2), the only refugees who were permitted to apply

for German asylum were those who had not reached Germany by way of the
aforementioned countries. Because Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and

Switzerland all border Germany on the southern and eastern sides, these countries
effectively served as a ring of buffer states between Germany and the war-torn

Balkans. Unless a Bosnian refugee had been able to reach Germany via an airplane

that had no layovers in any “safe third state,” he or she would not have been eligible

for asylum. Because Bosnia’s largest airport, Sarajevo International Airport, was put
under the control of Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) at the start of the war, nearly all

regularly scheduled flights were interrupted. Although, the airport was later turned
over to the UN to serve as a humanitarian base, it would have been exceedingly

difficult for fleeing Bosnians to book themselves on a direct flight to Germany, as the
airport was used for military and humanitarian purposes only. 155 As a result, many

refugees left Bosnian via rail or bus, and – due to the geographical circumstances –
had to drive through “safe third states” in order to reach Germany.

Perhaps the most ironic aspect of Germany’s amendment to restrict asylum

applications is that the government used various international refugee laws,

including the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, in order to justify doing so. Because
nearly half of the 700,000 Bosnians who had fled their homeland for the safety of
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other European countries attempted to seek asylum in Germany, the German

government sited the provision of the 1951 Convention that called for refugees to be
distributed equally amongst regional signatories. Additionally, by claiming that

Germany was not actually the “country of first refuge” for most, if not all, Bosnian

refugees (since most passed through a “safe third state” en route to Germany), the
government was able to avoid violating the non-refoulement clause of the 1951

Convention. Although this Amendment caused a steep drop in asylum applications
in Germany, many of the countries bordering Germany, including those that had
been categorized as “safe third states,” saw a sharp increase in asylum

applications. 156 However, it worth noting that in practice, the ramifications of

Amendment 16a(2) were as severe as the rhetoric would suggest. In a considerable
number of instances, Germany was not able to enforce the “safe third state” clause

because many of those countries refused to readmit asylum seekers, “either due to a
lack of proof that the applicant had entered German territory from that safe country

or because the applicant could not meet formal requirements, such as time limits for
filing a readmission request.” 157 In such cases when the third state refused

admission to refugees, Germany granted them entry in order to prevent refugees
from becoming stateless. 158

The content and implications Amendment 16a(2) were hotly debated both in

the governmental, public, and private spheres. It was not until May 15, 1996 –
nearly three years after the Amendment was approved by the Bundestag and
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Bundesrat – that Germany’s highest Constitutional Court issued a ruling that upheld
the new asylum law and regulations. 159 The Court suggested that the new law

“created a basis for European countries to try to spread the refugee burden.” 160

Despite the fact that the government was making it increasingly difficult for Bosnian
refugees to be granted asylum on a large scale, refugees whose applications had

already been accepted received a variety of benefits in keeping with the stipulations
of the 1951 Convention. These included “a temporary residence permit, the same

status as Germans within the social insurance system, social welfare, child benefits,

child-raising benefits, integration allowances and language courses as well as other
forms of integration assistance.” 161

It must also be said that while increased restrictions on asylum applications

prohibited many Bosnian refugees from settling in Germany, there were other

methods for refugees to legally gain access to the country. This alternative came in
the form of possessing an entry visa, which Bosnians could obtain by having a
German individual or organization sponsor them. As the fighting in Bosnia

intensified in the spring of 1992, millions of Germans became aware of and sensitive
to the horrors that many refugees were facing in their home country. As a result,
relatives, charitable organizations, friends of refugees, and church organizations

made efforts to vouch financial responsibility for various refugees who wanted to
Walker, German and Bosnian Voices, 4.
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come to Germany so that they would be granted the necessary entry visa. 162 This

shows that although the German government was greatly restricting the channels
through which refugees could claim asylum, this did not necessarily translate to a

complete closing of Germany’s border to refugees. Such a reality is demonstrative of
the fact that very rarely is legislation the only factor in determining how reality

plays out. Although the law may seem quite black and white when analyzed how it

appears on paper, this analysis does not take into account all that can occur outside

the small sphere of policy making and how those occurrences will influence written
policy and law.

The Gray Area – Policy and Citizens in Action

Thus, the narrative of restrictive asylum policies is not always indicative of

the lived realities of Bosnian refugees or their experiences with integration. From
1992-1995, millions of ordinary German citizens mobilized to come to the aid of

refugees, and helped to ease their transition into German society outside of efforts
originating with the government. William Walker provides many personal stories

that corroborate this point in this his book “German and Bosnian Voices in a Time of
Crisis.” In one of these anecdotes, Walker tells of a German housewife named Maria
Hurich, who was doing volunteer work with Caritas – a humanitarian aid and

charity organization of the Catholic Church – in her hometown of Steinenberg in the
south German state of Baden-Wurttemberg. When Frau Hurich was assigned to
162
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deliver goods to the Bosnian Croat Cakaric family, she felt a connection to them, and
sympathetic to their plight. The family had fled their home in Bosnia in 1992, and

was living in a one room flat with five family members – a father, a mother, and their
three children. Frau Hurich “decided to adopt the refugee family,” and assisted them
with registering with the local authorities to ensure the young family received the
government benefits to which they were entitled. 163 Because no one in the family

spoke any German so shortly after arriving in the country, Frau Hurich escorted the
family wherever they needed to go. She saw to it that the children were enrolled in

the neighborhood school, helped the father find a job, and provided support for the
mother on a daily basis. Frau Hurich devotion to the Cakaric family caused Mr.

Cakaric to proclaim, “In our house first comes God, then comes Frau Hurich.” 164

Although there are dozens (if not hundreds or thousands) of stories like this

one that attest to positive experiences of Bosnian refugees in Germany, they are
unfortunately not reflective of the experience of the majority. In fact, it can be

argued that no attempts were made to integrate Bosnian refugees into German

society at all, since supporting refugees on a long-term basis and providing them

with the resources to permanently establish new lives were never the goals of the
German government. Dr. Hans-Peter Friedrich, member of the German Bundestag

and Federal Minister of the Interior, stated in a report that the purpose of admitting
over 345,000 Bosnian refugees was to grant them temporary protection, “which
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serves primarily to handle a situation of mass flight or major influx of refugees from
war or civil war.” 165

Understanding this goal helps to put into context Germany’s decision to

repatriate hundreds of thousands of Bosnians following the signing of the Dayton
Accords in 1995, which effectively ended the fighting in Bosnia. Rather than

determine refugee status solely in accordance with the criteria laid out in the 1951
Convention, Germany elected to institute the “safe third state” policy to help offset

some of the obligations it would otherwise have had to follow, e.g. officially granting
asylum versus having the option of granting temporary protection status. Most

importantly, temporary protection status legally permitted Germany to undertake a
program of repatriation without violating non-refoulement principles once the
immediate danger of persecution had passed in Bosnia. 166

This specific course of action allowed Germany to operate within the

framework of the international refugee agreements to which it was (and still is) a
signatory while still accommodating contemporary domestic political interest.
Simon Bagshaw, a senior policy advisor at the United Nations Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, suggests in his article “Benchmarks or

Deutschmarks?” that granting the Bosnian refugees temporary protection to bypass
normal asylum procedures, which were often perceived as measures that “over165German
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burdened” the welfare system. In a period of “economic uncertainty and political

sensitivity,” the German interior ministers were reluctant to create the image that

Germany was being “overwhelmed” by refugees. 167 From 1992 to 1997, the German
government spent an estimated $3 billion annually in services for Bosnian

refugees. 168 At a time in which Germany’s reunification was still only a few years in
the past, the interior ministers of the German states had major concerns about the
security problems that an influx of refugees and asylum seekers posed.

The Interior Minister of North Rhine – Westphalia from 1987-2003,

Wolfgang Riotte, recalled the pressures that the ministers were under when

confronted with the refugee populations that were amassing near German borders.
He reported that, “in 1989-1990 (after the collapse of the Iron Curtain), nearly a
million people came to West Germany, then the Bundesrepublik.” 169 Riotte says,

“These were people who came from East Germany and ethnic Germans who came
from the Soviet Union.” 170 A communiqué from the office of the Chairman of the

Interior Ministers Conference claimed that this sudden influx “nearly exhausted the
accommodation and support possibilities of the states and communities [of West

Germany].” 171 This is of particular importance because the vast majority of Bosnian

refugees elected to settle in locations where they already had friends and family;

this tended to be in the southern and western German states (which had been under
Bagshaw, “Benchmarks or Deutschmarks?”, 569.
University of California Davis, "Migration News: Bosnians, Immigration Policy in
Germany." Last modified May 1997.
https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1229.
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West German control throughout the Cold War) and in West Berlin due to the

extremely restrictive immigration policies of East Germany (coupled with the fact

that economic opportunities in this part of the Soviet bloc were far less than those
that existed for workers in West Germany). 172 As a result of this decades long

settlement trend, Bosnian refugees poured into areas of Germany where welfare
and asylum services were already being maxed out. 173 This further limited

opportunities for integration into larger German society, and is yet another point of
explanation as to why Bosnian refugees in Germany had such different experiences
from their fellow displaced countrymen who had sought refuge in Sweden.

As previously discussed, the interior ministers’ long-term plan (more

accurately, the plan championed by the interior ministers from the southern,

conservative states who had taken in the largest amount of refugees) for Bosnian
refugees had always been an eventual return to Bosnia. This plan was clearly

outlined in an IMK communiqué, which read, “The Interior Ministers expect that the
German government will take timely measures to provide for the return of the
refugees at the conclusion of the peace talks.” 174 However, because various

international laws including the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the

Geneva Conventions had clear-cut stipulations regarding non-refoulement, Germany
was required to provide refugees with temporary protection until the conclusion of
the war, and – according to the 1951 Convention – until the point when “the
Walker, German and Bosnian Voices, 50.
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174 Ibid, 48.
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circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have
ceased to exist.” 175

Refugee Return: A Nation and a State Divided

The inherent problem with this stipulation is that it has been purposefully

rendered vague, as the determination of the specifics – such as the when, the where,
and the why – of possible repatriation is left to the discretion of the host state. In

other words, assessing whether or not it was ‘safe’ for Bosnian refugees to return to

their homeland was left in the hands of the German interior ministers. The day after
peace accords were signed in December 1995, an IMK conference was convened. It

was decided that because the war in Bosnia was officially over, refugees’ temporary
protection status had expired, and that it was permissible for repatriation efforts to
begin. 176 As the first European state to announce the end of temporary protection

status for refugees, Germany came under fire from the UNCHR and those who

believed that the return of refugees should be a coordinated effort amongst all
states that had served as temporary hosts. 177

In keeping with the hypothesis that the unique circumstances of German

history have heavily influenced the state’s outlook on refugee inclusivism and

integration, the condition of Berlin following the conclusion of World War II likely

played a pivotal role in Germany’s decision to repatriate Bosnian refugees as soon as
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Text of the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees."
176 Walker, German and Bosnian Voices, 56.
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it was a possibility. By 1945, Berlin had been reduced to a bombed-out shell of its

former self; industrial and residential areas alike had been repeated targets of Allied

airstrikes. Although this was a dark period in history for many Germans, residents of
Berlin prided themselves on the fact that many had remained in the city throughout
the war, and played a major part in rebuilding it from the ground-up. Many interior
ministers and other government officials who took a hardline stance on the

immediate return of refugees had the experience of living in post-war Berlin, and

explicitly cited this as a reason for their stance on refugee return – both compulsory
and voluntary. 178

William Walker, in his book “German and Bosnian Voices in Time of Crisis,”

recounts verbatim an interview he conducted with Jorg Schonbohm, an interior
senator in Berlin who was known for his hardline stance on refugee return.

Schonbohm is a retired German Army general and former deputy minister of
defense who entered politics after a thirty-five year career in uniform. After

witnessing the resilience of Berliners as a young boy in the wake of the decimation

caused by the war, Schonbohm’s opinion on citizens’ post-war time obligations had
been solidified. He stated in his interview, “If the Bosnian War is terminated and

there are no hostilities anymore, why can’t the refugees go home and rebuild their
own country and redo the infrastructure and go on living there?” 179

Another dimension of the debate on refugee return was based along political

lines, with the CDU (the right of center Christian Democratic Party) favoring more

immediate return of Bosnian refugees and the SPD (left of center Social Democratic
178
179
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Party) favoring more prolonged action. The divide was also prominent along

geographical lines, with some of the more northern German states, like SchleswigHolstein (who received fewer Bosnian refugees) advocating for a more cautionary
approach and the more southern states, like Bavaria (who received the most
Bosnian refugees) advocating for immediate action. Although the federal

government had officially declared Bosnia a “safe” place to expedite the return of

refugees, some of the more liberal state interior ministers protested that this claim
was misguided, and maintained that, “the land was destroyed, and armed war
criminals were still running around freely.” 180 In a direct response to interior

senator Schonbohm’s opinion, it was plainly asserted that the situation in Bosnia
“was not like in Germany at the end of the Second World War.” 181

The nature of the refugee returns was also hotly debated in the government

and public spheres. While the BAMF currently claims that “the great majority of

Bosnian refugees has since left Germany, most of them voluntarily and with help

from the relevant repatriation programmes” and that “persons who had suffered
severe trauma” had been granted special exceptions to remain in Germany

permanently, the accounts of many Bosnians do not reflect this. 182 At the beginning
of the repatriation program in 1996, the German government first tried to

incentivize return to Bosnia for specific groups of refugees, while granting
Ibid, 80.
Ibid.
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exceptions for those refugees who were in the midst of receiving medical care, had
young children in school, or were Bosnian Muslims from the territory of the

Republika Srpska. 183 However, as the repatriation program continued from 1997
until the early 2000’s, an increasingly large number of refugees reported being

forcibly repatriated despite belonging to the groups who had been granted initial

exceptions. This was especially true in the state of Bavaria, where many Bosnians

had not taken the government up on its offers of incentives to return to Bosnia. It is

worth noting that the German government, when calculating the number of Bosnian
refugees who returned to Bosnia “voluntarily”, included the refugees who had been
compelled to leave Germany after receiving threats of forcible deportation. 184 By
1998, the German government estimated that only 91,000 Bosnian refugees

remained in the country out of 345,000. 185 Today, fewer than 10,000 of these

refugees remain in Germany, many of them illegally. 186 While a small portion of this
group was granted permanent residency, the majority of them were ordered to
leave the country. 187
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An Unlikely Coalition? The Protestant Church and the Media in Defense of Refugees

Among those who came to the defense of Bosnian refugees and their plight

were the very institutions and individuals responsible for what little integration was
able to occur in the refugee population. The decisions of the interior ministers to

repatriate hundreds of thousands of Bosnian refugees caused public outrage, which
can largely be attributed to the nature of the coverage the German media was

providing on the issue. Many members of the German press corps, particularly those
who worked in television, were stationed in Bosnia in order to provide firsthand

reports on the war. Images of destruction, especially in Sarajevo, were transmitted

to millions of German television screens. When presented with a realistic picture of

the situation on the ground in Bosnia, the German public was largely appalled at the
immediacy of their government’s proposed refugee repatriation program. The

media was able to keep this issue at the forefront of public consciousness, as the
major news stations often interviewed interior ministers and other government
officials who held opposing opinions on refugee repatriation. For example, the
interior spokesman for the Free Democratic Party regularly made comments

criticizing Interior Minister Beckstein of Bavaria for not being sympathetic enough
to the plight of the refugees. Mr. Beckstein would then appear on the same news

outlets to respond to the comments. 188 The general stance of the media as well as
the public was that it would have been inhumane to send refugees back to such a

destroyed country. According to William Walker, the sympathy of the German public
188

Walker, German and Bosnian Voices, 73.

77

“was easy to understand given its tradition of being a nation friendly to guests
because of the memories of National Socialism.” 189

The media also provided ample coverage of the IMK conferences, and were

quick to report on (and criticize) the plans of action that the ministers had reached;
when the public learned of the government’s plan, the ministers were heavily

criticized amidst an immediate backlash. Germans took to the streets in protest in

Berlin and Bavaria after learning of the first coerced deportations, in what came to
be known as the Easter Appeal in March 1997. 190 The protestors maintained that
the government had crossed a line “set by postwar Germany in its obligation to

human rights”, and demanded that the return process occur more gradually. 191

Many Germans who openly criticized government plans were people who knew

Bosnian refugee families personally and had provided them with the support and

resources that the government had not. This included individuals with experiences

like Frau Hurich (who appeared personally in front of the courts in order to prevent
the deportation of the Cakaric family) and religious organizations, which had often
coordinated donation efforts for refugees, as well as provided them with a
community of support.

When the forced repatriation program began in Bavaria, Protestant Bishop

Hermann von Loewenich announced that church communities in the state would be

taking in refugees who had been seeking asylum in Germany. Bishop von Loewenich
stated in the English-language German news media outlet, Spiegel that his church
Ibid, 61.
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“would be standing by refugees who by injustice did not receive asylum and because
of that have been placed in danger.” 192 Because the Bishop acknowledged that

churches couldn’t possibly provide the same infrastructure for refugees that the

state could, its scope would have to be quite limited. Von Loewenich wanted to focus
on “the most difficult cases,” which included refugees who had been traumatized
and families that had young children in the school system. In the latter case, the
Bishop stated that young refugee children had been integrated into the German

school system, and remembered little, if anything about their country of origin. 193
Particularly in Bavaria, there was “a long list of Bosnian families for which

the church has cared for, given a place to live, had given the children clothes, and

found the parents work.” 194 In short, the Protestant Church had been responsible for
helping thousands of refugees integrate into German society and giving them the
assistance they needed to rebuild their lives. Because of this, church leaders had

large amounts of empathy for the struggles the refugees had experienced, and were
not willing to allow poorly devised government policy nullify their humanitarian
efforts.

Conclusion

Due to marked differences in areas such as citizenship history and

legislation, national histories, and political goals, Bosnian refugees who had fled to
"Vorbild Kanada." Spiegel, February 19, 1996.
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Germany had fundamentally different experiences than did their compatriots who
went to Sweden, despite the fact that the two countries are party to the same

international refugee law agreements. Of course, Germany’s historical tradition of

extremely restrictive citizenship laws and limitations on who is considered German
provided a serious roadblock for Bosnian refugees to have a legal future in the

country. Although some refugees were granted permanent residence after many
years of struggling for recognition in the face of rejected asylum applications,

hundreds of thousands of refugees had no choice but to return to Bosnia once

repatriation programs began. Although German citizenship laws have undergone a
significant liberalization in the last decade and a half, these policies did not go into
effect until the refugee crisis had long been over.

Historical context also played a pivotal role in terms of why refugees in

Germany did not receive the same support at government institutional levels as the
refugees in Sweden. In the wake of the Cold War and collapse of the Berlin Wall,

huge amounts of refugees poured into Germany, putting significant stress on the

refugee support network. As a result, when the Bosnian War began only two or so

years later, many of the government’s resources were already tapped out. Although
Germany was obligated to meet the bare minimum humanitarian standards set by
international agreements like the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the
government was able to circumvent any additional obligations by not officially

accepting the refugees’ applications for asylum. By instituting the “safe third state”

rule, Germany was able to create a legal loophole that permitted the government to
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grant Bosnian refugees temporary protection, which left a legitimate legal space to
institute repatriation programs at the conclusion of the war.

Despite the fact that Bosnian refugees did not exactly receive a warm

welcome from the German government, the public was extremely empathetic

toward the plight of the refugees. Many individuals and charitable organizations
voluntarily took on the responsibility of trying to integrate refugees as much as
possible and provide them with the resources and opportunities that the

government would not. Because of this warm reception by the public, many Bosnian
refugees recalled their time in Germany fondly, citing the generosity of the people
within their respective communities. 195 This dichotomy proves that the efforts a

government puts forth to help refugees rebuild are not the only factors to consider

when examining the treatment and levels of integration among refugee populations.
Although aid from the public cannot be a perfect substitute for government aid, it
certainly went a long way in shaping the experiences of Bosnian refugees in
Germany.

195

Ibid, 110.

81

Conclusion

In the wake of the disastrous World Wars of the 20th century, many

countries, including Germany and Sweden, signed on to international agreements
pertaining to the treatment of refugees in the hopes of preventing large-scale

humanitarian catastrophes from occurring in future. These agreements included the
1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the Geneva Convention, and the 1967
Protocol. In addition to bringing the plight of refugees to the forefront of the

international conscience, these agreements helped to establish universally observed
standards in order to ensure that all refugees were entitled to the same basic rights,
including the right to seek asylum when faced with persecution in their homelands.
Theoretically, these international agreements should have established

overarching guidelines around which governments could have crafted their own

nation’s policies regarding the treatment of refugees. However, it is clear that this is

not the case amongst the signatory countries, most notably in Sweden and Germany

during the height of the Bosnian War. This difference thus prompts a tension, even a
paradox, which is the main subject of this study: If all countries who are party to the
aforementioned agreements are obligated to follow the same standards of refugee
treatment, then what accounts for the vastly different refugee experiences with
regards to integration and inclusivism in Sweden and Germany?

In order to get to the root causes of this paradox, I categorized my research

to fit within the framework of these questions: What national attitudes regarding
citizenship inclusion and exclusion are codified in legislation? What kinds of
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national institutions, or lack thereof, are there to help facilitate refugee social

incorporation? How did media representations of Bosnian refugees influence their
experiences in these countries? These three areas serve as clear points of

comparison for Germany and Sweden, as nation’s citizenship policies and the

expansiveness of institutions that foster integration are often reflective of specific
national histories and state attitudes toward issues surrounding immigration and

inclusivism. In conjunction with this, media often plays a large role in both shaping
public opinion and in transmitting general public sentiments. Media can therefore

be indicative of yet another dimension of the lived experiences of Bosnian refugees
in both Sweden and Germany.

When examining these criteria in the context of Bosnian refugees in Sweden,

the support that refugees received on the governmental level was very much in

keeping with Sweden’s reputation of an inclusive, humanitarian-focused welfare
state. Despite these good intentions, social integration policies were not as

successful once they were implemented. Because of other factors like an economic
recession and pre-existing housing segregation, Bosnian refugees were not

presented with as many opportunities to integrate as government officials had once
hoped. Regardless of the limitations that reality presented to integration policies,

many refugees reported feeling satisfied with their new lives in Sweden. Although

policies were not as effective as initially planned, the stability that living in Sweden
with legal residency status provided coupled with the good intent behind the

policies helped to make many refugees feel relatively welcome and comfortable.
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Tens of thousands of Bosnian refugees who fled to Sweden at the beginning of the
war still remain there today.

In sharp contrast to Sweden’s generous government policies toward the

refugees, the Bosnians that fled to Germany had markedly different experiences. In

the time of the refugee crisis, German citizenship and naturalization laws were still
extremely restrictive as a result of policies being carried over from century to

century. While Sweden enjoyed an international reputation of being inclusive of
people of all races, ethnicities, and backgrounds, Germany was known for tying

citizenship to ethnic German ancestry. This alone would have made it extremely

difficult of Bosnians to be included in German society in every sense of the word. In

addition to restrictive citizenship laws, Germany’s ministries that had been designed
to provide services to refugees were already inundated in the early 1990’s due to

the collapse of the Berlin Wall and refugees hailing from the former East Germany
and the Soviet Union. This situation combined with a contentious political and

economic atmosphere led Germany to deny the applications of asylum seekers

(which would have obligated Germany to provide at least the bare minimum of

services stipulated in the international agreements) in favor of granting the refugees
temporary protection status.

Perhaps the one of the biggest explanations as to why Germany’s approach to

treating the refugees was fundamentally different from Sweden’s was that the longterm goals of each country were disparate on the most basic level. While Sweden’s

policies were instituted with the purpose of helping refugees permanently integrate
into Swedish life, German policies were enacted with the goal of harboring refugees
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in the country only until it was deemed safe for them to return to Bosnia. While

there are likely an incalculable amount of reasons as to why these goals came about,
my research exposed the following disparities: specific national histories in regards
to citizenship policies were central in providing the framework for contemporary
polices and legislation; the differences in the nature of the institutions that

facilitated integration (Sweden’s ministries were very centralized at the federal

level, while German policies were heavily contingent on local interior ministers,

whose experiences with refugees depended upon from which state they hailed),
which played a significant part in determining what the role of the government
should have been. When examined in these historical and political contexts,

different outcomes in Germany and Sweden appear less as a paradox, and more as
products of different national histories and political geographies.

The role non-governmental forces played in both countries were essential in

influencing lived experiences of Bosnian refugees. Because of the media coverage of
the horrors in Bosnia, the Swedish and German publics felt deep empathy for the

refugees and their plights, and wanted to help them rebuild their lives. Although the
German public did not have significant support from its government, individual

citizens and citizen-groups were able to provide some refugees with the resources
they needed, which caused many Bosnians to hold favorable opinions of Germany,
despite being repatriated and not having the same legal options to remain in the

country as did the Bosnian refugees in Sweden. Entities such as churches and the

clergy were able to mobilize citizens in Germany to help provide the refugees with
much-needed resources. This is yet another interesting point of departure; in
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Sweden where governmental institutions were supportive of refugees, there was no
need for individual citizens to become activists, whereas in Germany, individual
citizens stepped in where the state institutions withdrew.

The cases of Bosnian refugees in Sweden and Germany also reveal this

important takeaway with regards to providing an explanation for the “paradox”–

although international agreements often provide a general framework for national
policies toward refugees, state’s respective histories and their respective goals

appear to play a much larger role in shaping the specifics of these national policies
than does international law. However, as the world’s legal codes become

increasingly connected via a network of multinational and extra-national

institutions, states will have to find ways to reconcile their national histories and
existing policies with this new international framework.

While international agreements and standards are generally viewed as a

positive product of globalization, particularly in the context of universal

humanitarianism, implementation of these new standards is often at odds with preexisting laws and policies. Although cross-national issues require cross-national

solutions –particularly in the case of refugee flows – it can be quite difficult for
states to adopt international agreements that are capable of addressing the

problems that present themselves on the smaller national and regional levels. Of
course, this also raises questions about which legal codes should be the basis of
state policy (international or national), and to what degree states are legally

obligated to change their national laws to reflect newly derived international laws.
As we have seen with these case studies on refugee inclusion, the tensions
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surrounding these issues are very much in play, and will likely continue to be

present in the future when discussing international humanitarian obligations.
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